SOUTHERN ARABIA

Early Islamic historiographical tradition lumped the peoples of southern Arabia together as Qahtanites, and the geographical area of southern Arabia as Qahtan. However, as with the terms Adnanites and Ishmaelites in reference to the north-central Arabian peoples, the terms Qahtanite/Qahtan are closely linked to historically dubious genealogies that connect the peoples of southern Arabia to a mythological progenitor mentioned in the Torah, the Bible, and the Quran. Although I do not accept the historical accuracy of these genealogies, I do think the terms Qahtanite/Qahtan are as good a general term to use in reference to all of southern Arabia and its peoples as any (Yemeni/Yemen is anachronistic). However, by the end of the Iron Age in Arabia (ca. 400 BCE), there were four distinct Hamitic-language groups in southern Arabia—the Sabaeans, Minaeans, Qatabanians, and Hadramites—as well as a loosely associated group of Semitic-language nomadic peoples—the Kahlans. During the Bronze Age, the Sabaeans and Hadramites developed the first states (ca. 1000-850 BCE), initially based on agricultural communities but later strengthened by trade with India, Persia, East Africa, and the Mediterranean. The Sabaean state initially arose in the Valley of the Dhana, among the northeastern foothills of the Haraz Mountains, and the Hadramite state initially arose along the southern foothills of their eponymous mountain range (i.e., the Hadramawt Mountains), which forms much of the northern border of modern Yemen (separating it from the Great Arabian Desert). Each of these states were ruled by a priest-king called a mukarrib ("unifier"), but due to the nature of this office I am not certain whether it is proper to refer to these early states as kingdoms or republics or perhaps even constitutional monarchies (see next paragraph). By about 850 BCE, two other groups emerged in southern Arabia—the Minaeans and the Qatabanians. The Minaeans inhabited a string of city-states that developed at caravanserai along the trade routes that passed through the Sayhad Desert region (in the gap between the Hadramawt Mountains to the east, and the southern Sarawat Mountains to the west), which lay to the north of Saba. The Qatabanians inhabited the southern and western foothills and valleys of the Haraz Mountains (south and west of Saba) from the Red Sea (to the west) to the coastal plain of the Mehri (to the east). The Minaean city-states appear to have emerged as vassals of Saba—the early Sabaean and Hadramite states were dominated by a quasi-feudal elite, whose power was based on agricultural estates and martial prowess, and the Minaeans seem to have initially had a monopoly on trade with the north via the Dedanite Kingdom of northern Arabia, with whom they seem to have established strong diplomatic relations. By contrast, the Qatabanian city-state known as Awsan/Ausan (ca. 850-670 BCE) emerged as a rival of Saba, located in the Markhah Valley directly southeast of Saba (in the northeastern quarter of Qatabania). Awsan has some very impressive archeological remains that imply it may have enjoyed some sort of imperial hegemony over some or all of the other Qatabanian tribes, but we simply do not know for certain the extent of their domains. However, in 670 BCE the mukarrib of Saba, Karib'il Watar bin Dhamar'ali (ca. 685-675 BCE)(a.k.a., Karibil the Great), destroyed Awsan, and he and his successors annexed the remainder of Qatabania (ca. 675-600 BCE). Karibil also carried out a series of campaigns that brought the Minaean city-states fully into the orbit of Saba, and he also seems to have forced the Hadramites to accept an alliance in which the Sabaeans were clearly the senior partner (i.e., Hadramawt may have been something akin to a vassal- or client-state of Saba). By that time, the Hadramites had conquered the coastal Mehri peoples, which means that the Sabaeans seem to have established almost complete hegemony in southern Arabia (only the nomadic Kahlans appear to have remained independent). The Sabaeans had also extended their power and influence across the Red Sea, establishing a trade colony (ca. 600 BCE) in the territory of the Cushitic Kingdom of Dm't/Damut/Damot/Dmaat on the Red Sea coast of East Africa (roughly analogous to the territory of modern-day Eritrea). However, by about 500 BCE there was serious internal discord in the Sabaean hegemony, with frequent Minaean, Hadramite, and Qatabanian rebellions (the first collapse of the Marib Dam, in central Sabaean territory, seems to have been the result of a breakdown of centralized power that led to famine, which only increased the social discord within Saba). The fortunes of the Sabaeans waxed and waned until about 410 BCE—the beginning of the period covered by this gallery—when the Sabaean hegemony broke apart under mysterious circumstances, resulting in the formation of the Kingdom of Saba (marking a shift in power from the mukarribs to the maliks), the Kingdom of Ma'in (formed by the Minaeans after breaking away from Saba), the Kingdom of Qatabania (formed by the Qatabanians after breaking away from Saba), and the Kingdom of Hadramawt (which ended its alliance with Saba and formed one with Ma'in, ca. 400-300 BCE). 

 

The earliest Qahtanite states are believed to have developed as the result of cultural assimilation between a native South Arabian population with migrants from Kush (ca. 1070-1000 BCE). The Kushites were an Hamitic language-speaking people (ethnic Nubians) that established an empire along the lower Nile River, south of the Kingdom of Egypt (ca. 1070 BCE-350 CE), and they often dominated the peoples along the Red Sea coast (Damot) and the highlands of Ethiopia (Abyssinia). Early myths regarding the Queen of Sheba indicated a possible location for her kingdom in East Africa (the Torah, Bible, and Quran are geographically unclear on this point), and although it is now believed Sheba is analagous with Saba, it is likely that the confusion stems from the close cultural, linguistic, and economic ties that formed between East Africa and southern Arabia during the Iron Age (the linguistic evidence has often been given particular weight, since the Kushites and Qahtanites both spoke Hamitic languages). Kushite interest in southern Arabia was primarily economic, stemming from its preponderance of easily harvestable aromatics (e.g., balsam, frankincense, myrhh, ambergris) and spices (e.g., cloves, nutmeg, cassia), but the greater agricultural potential of Qahtan seems to have fed (literally and figuratively) the growth of the first complex socio-political aggregates. The relatively complex social and political organization, and craft specialization, of each southern Arabian group allowed them to master a particular region and better exploit the agricultural potential of that region, which of course only accelerated the ability of these groups to become more organized and technologically advanced. Unlike the nomadic and semi-nomadic groups (i.e., the Mehri and Kahlans), whose socio-political structure (like those in central and northern Arabia) was more egalitarian and based on the inter-relationship of different branches of extended kin groups, the early Qahtanite kingdoms developed along quasi-feudal lines in which land ownership, wealth derived from operating trade caravans, and patron-client relationships overlay the basic kin-based social structures. The landowning elite organized agricultural labor via a patron-client system wherein a patron (mir) organized the labor of tribesmen who were his or her clients (dim). Agricultural communities were centered on villages (bayt), and the various kin-groups associated with these villages banded together as tribes (sha'b) to control a given region (usually each tribe controlled a valley or series of adjacent valleys, and/or terraced highland slopes, as well as the neighbring wadis where the water that flowed through their valley(ies) flowed out onto the plains or into the sea). Tribal assemblies, probably consisting of patron-landowners and kin-group patriarchs/matriarchs, governed the people and organized labor for civic projects (usually involving the need for developing and maintaining water catchment and distribution systems—i.e., building and maintaining dams, cisterns, and aqueducts). A body of traditional tribal law (sunna) developed, which governed social relationships and defined the rights of clients and patrons. Patrons were expected to use a portion of their wealth and influence to fund civic projects and organize the necessary labor (i.e., public euergetism). The later Muslim title, imam, meaning a religious teacher, has its origins in the Pre-Islamic Period, where it meant someone that lives in accordance with tribal law (kind of like calling someone a law-abiding citizen), often used in reference to righteous leaders, so there was definitely a quasi-religious imperitive to civic virtue (i.e., money and power were tools that needed to be used responsibly in accordance with custom and the will of the gods). This quasi-religious imperitive to civic virtue seems to have found its greatest expression in the offices of the malik and the mukarrib. Among the nomads, tribal chiefs were known as sheikh, but among the more-populous agrarian peoples of southern Arabia each tribe had a king (malik). Presumably, these more-complex socio-economic communities found governance through a tribal council too cumbersome—tribal councils evolved into quasi-legislative assemblies, while the office of king evolved into an elective executive position. By about 900 BCE, two major regional federations had developed—Saba and Hadramawt—each consisting of a coalition of kingdoms that shared economic interests and cultic practices. As with the tribal kingdoms, these regional hegemonies were governed through a council and an executive using the title of mukarrib ("unifier"). The early maliks and mukarribs seem to have been something akin to warrior priest-kings—they led the army in battle, performed important religious rites of the local cult(s), and enforced tribal law. Their power was not absolute, and tribal assemblies continued to fulfill a legislative and advisory function, but the maliks and mukarribs acted like chief executives and high priests, and were usually landowning gentry in their own right (mukarribs were usually selected from among the maliks of a given federation). Also as a result of the development of these more-complex socio-political aggregates, we see the emergence of really powerful landowning gentry called qayls. This term is often translated as "dukes" because they developed into a quasi-feudal warrior aristocracy, although I think "chiefs" is probably better (it's more general, and not Eurocentric). As tribes and tribal coalitions expanded the territories under their dominion, these great chiefs were able to increase their wealth and power through the capture of booty, the enslavement of captives, and by incorporating more land into their personal domains (captives/slaves were allowed to continue to farm the land formerly belonging to their village and/or tribe, but under much-reduced social standing). As we have seen, two other socio-political groups had emerged by about 850 BCE—the Minaeans and the Qatabanians—although both emerged within the Sabaean hegemony, and the leaders of both of these groups never attempted to use the title of mukarrib, even during periods when they were independent of Saba (their leaders always styled themselves as malik).

 

This socio-political and economic accretion led to the development of the Iron Age states discussed above—Saba (ca. 1000-410 BCE), Awsan (ca. 850-670 BCE), Hadramawt (ca. 1000-410 BCE), and Qataban (ca. 670-410 BCE). Of these, Saba emerged as the primary regional hegemon (see above). Awsan was destroyed, the Qatabanians were dominated by Saba, and the Hadramites were forced into an alliance with Saba. The Minaean city-states (Yathill, Qarnaw, Haram, Kaminahu, Nashan, and Inabbah) seem to have enjoyed a degree of autonomy, although they were clearly subordinated to the Sabaean state (they essentially acted as the middle-men between the qayls of Saba and the Dedanites). However, the offices of mukarrib of Saba and mukarrib of Hadramawt were not dynastic monarchies. Instead, the power of the chiefs/qayls seems to have grown as commerce supplemented land as a source of wealth, and the offices of malik and mukarrib simply became a title that conferred prestige and carried with it little administrative power (basically, the kings and unifiers were first-among-equals of the chiefs). One can even imagine that such offices came to be an economic burden, since they entailed civic and religious duties that required personal expenditure (note the parallels with Republican Rome). This changed by 410 BCE, when we see the emergence of Sumhu'ali Yanuf as king (malik) of Saba, while other parts of the Sabaean hegemony broke away under their own royal dynasties—the city-states of the Minaeans broke away to form the Kingdom of Ma'in, and the Qatabanians broke away and formed the Kingdom of Qatabania, while the Hadramites fully asserted their independence (and their leaders also stopped styling themselves as mukarrib and started using malik). Unfortunately, the exact sequence of events that led to this royal revolution are unknown, and the reason for the change in royal titles is a matter of conjecture. All we know is that by 410 BCE, we see the emergence of these four kingdoms, each of whom was ruled by a king (malik) that increasingly governed through a bureaucratic system with a council of senior administrators (qyn) that oversaw various palace administrative organs, prefects (kabir) that governed important cities, and tribal leaders (musawad) that governed rural districts. However, the power of the quasi-feudal qayls was not broken, and they continued to be the power behind these new administrative organs. Indeed, what seems to have happened is that there was a shift from a more democratic system in which common tribesmen had more of a say in the tribal assemblies to a system that was overtly oligarchic (once again, I think comparison to Republican Rome is apropos).

 

Sabaean Kingdom (410 BCE - 25 BCE & 100 - 280 CE), Raydanite Kingdom (25 BCE - 100 CE)

During the Iron Age, the Sabaean state of Saba/Sheba (1000-410 BCE) emerged early as a southern Arabian powerhouse, fueled in part by the spice and incense trade, and dominating (Hadramawt) or destroying (Awsan) its two main rivals. The Biblical tale of the Queen of Sheba's state visit to King Solomon of Israel records the fabled wealth and power of the early Sabaean state—comparing a woman to the Queen of Sheba (ca. 970-931 BCE) remains to this day an expression that implies she is a spoiled diva. The Sabaeans established a capital at Ma'rib/Mariaba in the Valley of the Dhana, and constructed the massive Marib Dam on the Wadi Adhana to significantly increase the agricultural potential of the valley (ca. 700 BCE). The patron deity (shym) of the Sabaeans was Muqah the Preserver (al-Maqah), although Athtar (god of battle) often rose to preeminence during times of war. The Marib Dam was an architectural wonder that served the Valley of the Dhana for over 1,000 years (impressive even by modern standards). It remained in operation until 570 CE, although there were a number of minor breaches leading up to the full collapse (in 449, 450, 542, and 548 CE), and its final collapse is often credited in early Islamic sources for setting off a mass migration of Kahlan and Qahtanite tribes into central and northern Arabia. But as we have seen in the discussion of northern and central Arabia, modern scholars tend to point to the shift from overland to seaborne trade (ca. 200 BCE-100 CE), which had weakened the inland tribes, federations, and kingdoms that relied on the overland caravans, and thus the series of collapses that led to the final destruction of the Marib Dam are now generally considered to be a symptom of the decline of the inland Kahlan and Qahtanite states (sometimes called "the caravan kingdoms"), and not the cause. Indeed, the Sabaean state itself had ceased to be an independent entity by the time of the final collapse of the Marib Dam (see below). We also know that the migration of Qahtanite tribes to the north occurred over a much longer period of time, both in search of greater economic prospects closer to the borders of Hellenistic Syria, Rome, and Persia, and as the result of political revolutions in the south (i.e., the losing groups would usually migrate out of the region to escape persecution). In the centuries following the construction of the Marib Dam, the Sabaeans steadily expanded their water catchment and distribution system with a series of dams, cisterns, and aqueducts in neighboring valleys (and neighboring peoples imitated them), turning the Haraz Mountain region of southern Arabia into a relatively lush paradise (ca. 700-60 BCE).

 

As we have seen, Sabaean hegemony eventually came to encompass most of southern Arabia by about 600 BCE. The fragmentation of this empire in the late fifth century BCE led to a contraction of the Sabaean hegemony into its homelands, and the foundation of the Kingdom of Saba by Sumhu'ali Yanuf (ca. 410 BCE). What prompted the collapse of the early Sabaean hegemony is much debated, but when the Marib Dam suffered its first collapse in 500 BCE, Saba was already in the midst of what turned out to be a decades-long drought, and it seems the resulting collapse of agriculture in central Saba, with attendant privations and famine, led to a period of social anarchy and political revolution. Under such circumstances, maintaining control of the Minaeans, Qatabanians, and Hadramites was impossible, and these federations broke away under their own rulers (ca. 410 BCE). The Sabaeans were not stupid, however, and they clearly saw the writing on the wall—the trade caravans still provided a source of wealth, but the future lay with the merchant fleets, and if Saba were to survive it was going to need access to both. Qataban controlled the Red Sea littoral to the west of Saba, as well as the Erythraean Sea littoral to the south of Saba. Ma'in controlled the trade caravans to the north (running through the Sayhad and Tihama), and due to an alliance with Hadramawt (ca. 410-300 BCE), the Ma'in-Hadramawt alliance dominated the caravan trade for about a century (the Hadramites also had access to the Erythraean Sea along the southern coastline of the Arabian Peninsula, so they could tap into the growing sea trade). The Sabaean Kingdom may have had something to do with the dissolution of the Minaean-Hadramite alliance (ca. 410-300 BCE), and after the collapse of this alliance they managed to conquer the Kingdom of Ma'in (ca. 300-190 BCE) and restore Saba's unrestricted access to the northern trade caravans. They also moved against the Qatabanians, reconquered Qatabania (ca. 335-200 BCE), lost it to a resurgent Qatabanian dynasty (ca. 200 BCE-150 CE), and then formed an alliance with Hadramawt against Qataban that led to the final breakup of the Qatabanian Kingdom—the eastern regions were annexed by Hadramawt, the central regions were annexed by Saba, and the western regions were united under the kings of Himyar (see below). This gave the Sabaeans access to the sea (the annexed Qatabanian territories included the important port city of Aden), although the kings of Saba also attempted to annex western Qatabania and thereby take control of the Red Sea coast.

 

It is with the attempted annexation of western Qatabania that Saba seems to have hit the first snag in its attempt to re-establish hegemony in all of southern Arabia. The western Qatabanian tribes had united under the Himyarites (ca. 110-25 BCE), a previously obscure group of highland tribes whose territories lay in the western foothills and valleys of the Haraz Mountains. The Sabaeans were able to establish hegemony over the Himyarites between 25 BCE and 100 CE, at which time several Sabaean kings used the title, "King of Saba and Dhu Raydan," Raydan being the Sabaean rendering of the name of the Himyarite capital city, Zafar. The Sabaeans were also at that time in control of Ma'in and central Qataban, but no Sabaean king felt it necessary to add the royal titles of these states to his titles, so it has been suggested that Sabaean hegemony in Himyar may have been achieved not through conquest, but through some sort of dynastic union. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the first several kings during this period had Sabaean names, and then as we progress toward the end of this relatively brief period (125 years), the names of the kings are either Himyarite or mixed Himyarite-Sabaean. Therefore, during this period (ca. 25 BCE-100 CE) the Sabaean-Himyarite kingdom is sometimes known as the Raydanite Kingdom. Whatever political détente may have been reached, it was apparently a stormy relationship that fell apart by about 100 CE when the Himyarites declared their independence from Saba, with the aid of new allies from across the Red Sea in East Africa, in the form of the Axumite Kingdom. The Axumites were Agaws—the name of the Kushitic peoples that inhabited the Red Sea coast of what is today Eritrea and northern Ethiopia—and the name of their state comes from their capital city of Axum, which was originally one of the cities of ancient D'mt/Damot. By 100 CE, the Axumite Kingdom had replaced Damot as the primary coastal kingdom on the East African side of the Red Sea. They ejected the Sabaean trading colony and apparently lent material support to the Himyarites, while the Axumites also launched an invasion across the Red Sea to occupy the Plain of Tihama. They established an inland colony at the former Minaean city of Najran, which commanded one of the main passes in the southern Sarawat Mountains that led from Qahtan into Tihama (this was clearly aimed at cutting off Saba from the northern caravan trade). Unfortunately, the early history of the Axumite state is unknown (Damot's history is equally obscure), but its heartlands were the same as Damot (i.e., Eritrea), so it is possible that the beginning of the Axumite era simply marks a change of dynasties in the same polity. The Axumites went on to conquer the Abyssinian peoples of the central Ethiopian highlands, and to form an economic-military alliance with the Roman Empire that was aimed at dominating the Red Sea.   

 

Landlocked and surrounded by enemies, the Sabaean state rapidly declined (ca. 100-280 CE), although the Sabaean king, Sha'r Awtar (ca. 225-235 CE) made a last bid for empire. He failed to drive the Axumites from Tihama or to re-establish hegemony over the Himyarites, but he defeated the Hadramites at the Battle of Dhat-Ghayl, went on to storm and burn the Hadramite capital, Shabwat, and to capture and execute the Hadramite king, Il'azz Yalut, and his sons. The Hadramite Kingdom fell apart (the Hadhrami broke up into a number of tribal polities), and the Sabaeans appeared poised to make a comeback. Sha'r Awtar also defeated the nomadic Kahlans at the Battle of Qaryat dhat-Kahlim, but his successes proved ephemeral. Despite Sha'r Awtar's victory at Qaryat dhat-Kahlim, the impoverishment of the caravan trade had led to an increase in the boldness of the nomadic peoples of southern Arabia (primarily Kahlans), and nomads had been increasingly infiltrating Tihama, the Sayhad, Dhofar, and Qahtan for almost two centuries. They both sought to remove the oasis-dwellers as middlemen (those parts of Tihama not controlled by the Axumites had been inflitrated by nomadic groups by about 50 BCE), so they could have direct access to the dwindling markets and act as middle-men themselves, and they often served as mercenaries in the armies of the southern kingdoms. As happened with Rome and her federates, these groups sometimes settled in large numbers, and proved more independent-minded than their erstwhile overlords liked. Hadramawt had been weakened by the same factors that had affected Saba—loss of wealth from the trade caravans, the growing monopolization of sea trade by foreign powers (Axumites and Romans in the Red Sea, the Persians and Indians in the Erythraean Sea and the Persian Gulf), climatic shifts and the impact of centuries of intensive farming that were leading to the aridization of southern Arabia, and raids and rebellions by nomadic groups—and despite Saba's victory over Hadramawt, the Sabaeans were unable to establish any kind of meaningful control over Hadramawt (some Hadramite groups migrated north, and the remainder remained divided into tribal groups with no recognized central power). When Sha'r Awtar's successors continued to face internal discord, as well as a renewed campaign by the Axumite-Himyarite alliance, the Himyarites finally managed to conquer the Sabaean Kingdom (ca. 270-280 CE). Mariaba and the Marib Dam continued to be an important civic and cultic center under the Himyarites until the final collapse of the dam in 570 CE, but the independent state of the Sabaeans was gone for good.